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What Is the ‘Social’ in Behavioural Economics? 




This is a draft chapter. The final version will be available in Research Methods in Consumer 
Law: A Handbook edited by Hans-W. Micklitz, Anne-Lise Sibony and Fabrizio Esposito, 
forthcoming 2018, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further permission of the 




Behavioural economics builds on psychology rather than on sociology, and on cognitive 
science rather than the science of culture. The same is true for new behavioural scholarship in 
the legal discipline, whether this is referred to as ‘behavioural law and economics’ or ‘law 
and the behavioural sciences’. The result of a one-sided definition of a more realist research 
agenda in legal scholarship is an impoverished understanding of the ‘social’. In Thaler and 
Sunstein’s famous concept of nudging, social conformity appears as a property of the 
individual, which can be instrumentalized by social nudges. More generally, the cognitive 
strand of behavioural economics lends itself to strategies of regulatory ‘debiasing’, which 
suggests that it is possible to get down to pure preferences that are free from any distortions. 
While this approach neglects the endogeneity, or social contingency, of individual 
preferences, the social strand of behavioural economics is explicitly concerned with the 
dynamics of social interaction, or the effects of social interdependence. However, both 
strands of behavioural economics are still higher on methodological individualism, 
naturalism or positivism and lower on institutionalism, culturalism or constructivism than a 
genuinely sociological approach. More specifically, their understanding of the ‘social’ does 
not sufficiently account for the social embeddedness of both rational and irrational economic 
action. What is more, behavioural economics also lacks the means to reflect on the link 
between science and politics, which includes the question of why different models of 
economic man are attractive at different points in time. The conceptual move from rational to 
behavioural economic man bears distinctive policy implications, which are in line with the 
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transformation of welfare capitalism towards ‘less state’ and ‘more market’. While the 
overall direction of this project gets blurred in Thaler and Sunstein’s branding of ‘libertarian 
paternalism’, it is evident in the adaptation of consumer policies, which proceeds under the 
imperative of market-conformity. Accordingly, a strategy of nudging does not put into 
question the wider institutional context but offers a technical solution to what is defined as a 
problem of individual behavioural rigidities and cognitive biases in the market environment. 
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Behavioural economics is without doubt a flourishing research field, which has already 
changed the economic discipline and also gained much political influence. However, not 
everybody shares the enthusiasm about the new approach and its policy applications, and a 
good deal of scepticism can be found, in particular, among sociologists and social theorists. A 
pointed criticism from this end of the social sciences is that behavioural economics has, at 
least in its most prominent core, an impoverished understanding of the ‘social’.1 Considering 
that the new ‘inter-discipline’ builds more on psychology than on sociology, and on cognitive 
science rather than on the science of culture, this may be little surprising. But the neglect of 
                                                        
1 Will Leggett, ‘The Politics of Behaviour Change: Nudge, Neoliberalism and the State’ (2014) Policy & 
Politics 3-19, at 11. 
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social complexity also has normative implications, which come to the fore when behavioural 
economics is taken to the law. 
In line with Thaler and Sunstein’s bestseller Nudge,2 an important strand of behavioural law 
and economics observes social reality through the lens of cognitive biases, and acts on it 
through behavioural nudges. In doing so, it combines an epistemology of failure with a 
technology of governance, the main reference point of which is the individual human being. 
This naturally limits its understanding of what is variously referred to as the ‘social 
environment’, ‘social influences’, or ‘social norms’. Bearing the ‘technocratic’ imprint of the 
overall approach,3 the conception of the social is narrowed down to ‘social nudges’, which 
make use of the fact that people can be influenced by what other people do and think, and 
which either work by simply ‘informing’ the target subjects about or by subliminally 
‘priming’ them into the expected behaviour.4 In other words, social conformity appears as a 
property of the individual, or another form of cognitive bias. At the same time, Sunstein’s 
account of the social context which indubitably shapes individual behaviour, and does so 
quite generally and globally, remains rather vague. Acknowledging that ‘[t]he social 
environment influences choices’, he can first think of it only as ‘a product of self-conscious 
designers or some kind of invisible-hand mechanism’. 5  Only in a later step, he adds 
organically grown institutions, like customs and traditions, to this dichotomous picture.6 
However, more important than the notion of social environment is the concept of ‘choice 
architecture’ in this behavioural approach, which explicitly includes extra-social forces, such 
as the weather.7 This dilutes the significance of the institutional setting in shaping choice long 
before it is made. Even though social institutions may appear as ‘fixed’ at a certain time and 
place, one can assume that they are still more malleable by social collectives than the 
weather. 
                                                        
2 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness 
(Yale University Press 2008). 
3 Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony, ‘Epilogue: The Legitimacy and Practicability of EU Behavioural 
Policy-Making’ in Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European 
Perspective (Hart Publishing 2015) 325-347, at 336. 
4 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge (n. 2 above), ch. 3. 
5 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism’ (2013) Yale Law Journal 
1826-1899, at 1879, including footnote 177. 
6 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘The Ethics of Nudging’ (2015) Yale Journal on Regulation 413-450, at 418 and 422. 
7 Ibid., at 421. 
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A more contextual approach to questions of ‘law and behavioural sciences’8 would also be 
interested in the social contingency of cognitive biases and behavioural nudges, both from an 
empirical and a normative point of view. Sociologically speaking, even the choice ‘to nudge 
or not to nudge’9 is entirely endogenous. It is a reflection of how complexity is reduced, 
meaning is created, and politics is made in contemporary society. In this sense, ‘debiasing 
through law’10 is not just a solution to a problem that would be undeniably given, but it 
actually defines the problem as one of cognitive failure, attributes it to individual human 
beings, and offers a technical solution without regard to ‘the distribution of economic and 
political power’.11 This objection concerns public as well as private nudges, which implies 
‘public nudges’ counteracting ‘private nudges’, 12  no matter if they aim to reduce or, 
alternatively, exploit cognitive biases (including the desire for social conformity) to promote 
individual and collective welfare. 
 
Having said this, any wholesale criticism of behavioural economics and its policy 
applications tends to overlook the heterogeneity of the field, which also includes more 
nuanced understandings of the ‘social’, laying emphasis on the dynamics of social 
interaction. Against this backdrop, this chapter follows a two-fold aim. On the one hand, it 
seeks to reconstruct the methodological foundations for a policy of nudging, which has 
become a central reference point in discussing the normative implications of the behavioural 
turn.13 This inevitably leads to a narrowing-down of the perspective on the most publicized 
parts of the field. On the other hand, the chapter also aims to work towards a broader 
assessment of the methodological position of behavioural economics against the backdrop of 
old and new methodological debates within and beyond the economic discipline. This 
requires opening-up the perspective beyond the ‘cognitive’ component of behavioural 
                                                        
8  Anne-Lise Sibony and Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of Behavioural Policy-Making: A European 
Perspective’ in Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective 
(Hart Publishing 2015) 1-25, at 9. 
9 Daniel M. Hausman and Brynn Welch, ‘Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge’ (2010) Journal of Political 
Philosophy 123-136. 
10 Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Debiasing Through Law’ (2006) Journal of Legal Studies 199-241; 
Daniel Pi, Francesco Parisi and Barbara Luppi, ‘Biasing, Debiasing, and the Law’ in Eyal Zamir and Doron 
Teichman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 
145-166. 
11 Ana C. Santos, ‘Behavioural and Experimental Economics: Are They Really Transforming Economics?’ 
(2011) Cambridge Journal of Economics 705-728, at 722. 
12 Alemanno and Sibony, ’Epilogue’ (n. 3 above), at 328. 
13 Leggett, ’Politics of Behaviour Change’ (n. 1 above), at 4. 
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economics to give more space to what has been referred to as its ‘social’ component.14 
Suffice it to say that this is still a selective take on scholarship in this field, but it helps to 
refine the criticism from the viewpoint of its contenders. This includes scholars working in 
the interdisciplinary field of socio-economics, which like behavioural economics developed 
in opposition to neoclassical economics, but took a different route in elaborating alternatives. 
To compare and interrelate behavioural economics and socio-economics in methodological as 
well as institutional terms is a third goal of this chapter. 
 
Framed by introduction and conclusion, the argument proceeds in six steps. It starts from the 
question of how the methodological debate between neoclassical economics and behavioural 
economics relates to the original ‘battle over methods’ in the economic discipline (section 1). 
To clarify the differences with older projects of historical and social economics, which were 
marginalized by the neoclassical mainstream, it is pointed out that behavioural economics 
links more with psychology than with sociology and history (section 2). Subsequently, the 
chapter turns to the methodological differences between the ‘cognitive’ and ‘social’ 
components of behavioural economics, which presumably also differ in their normative 
implications (section 3). The following step consists in a reconstruction of the institutional 
separation of behavioural economics and socio-economics, which share a ‘realist’ critique of 
neoclassical economics but attract different kinds of scholars (section 4). This is followed by 
an attempt to outline main points of contention between the two movements, drawing on 
theoretical classifications and representative viewpoints in lieu of a proper methodological 
debate (section 5). Finally, the chapter contrasts the model of behavioural economic man with 
rational and cultural economic man and discusses the hidden meaning, or cultural 
significance, of governance by nudges (section 6). 
 
 
1. The new battle over methods between neoclassical economics and behavioural economics 
 
The original ‘battle over method’ in the economic discipline took place between the Austrian 
school and the German historical school and unfolded in two rounds in the late nineteenth 
                                                        
14 Luca Zarri, ‘Behavioural Economics Has Two “Souls”: Do They Depart From Economic Rationality?’ (2010) 
Journal of Socio-Economics 562–567. 
 6 
and early twentieth century. 15  The initial proponents were Carl Menger and Gustav 
Schmoller. While both schools of economic thought have to be distinguished from 
neoclassical economics, the Austrian school is much closer to the latter than the German 
historical school. Interestingly, scholars on both sides of the battle line ‘share the substantive 
concept of a social economy’, which is ‘a commonality overlooked or neglected in the 
literature favoring their differences’. 16  Menger had a more realistic understanding of 
economic action and social institutions but shared the methodological individualism of the 
rational choice approach.17  Schmoller favoured the empirical description and analysis of 
historical, social and political aspects of the national economy and thus was more collectivist 
in orientation.18 
In the first round of the battle over methods, the more empirical, inductive and collectivist 
approach of the historical school of economics, which had been dominant in the German-
speaking countries, was challenged by the more theoretical, deductive and individualist 
approach of the Austrian school, which became more influential after. The second round took 
place two decades later and concerned not only the economic discipline but also the new 
discipline of sociology. The focus of the renewed methodological debate, which is also 
known as the ‘battle over value judgements’ (Werturteilsstreit), was the distinction between 
‘is’ and ‘ought’, or between positive and normative approaches. 
From today’s perspective, the battle over methods marked the beginning of the reign of 
neoclassical mainstream economics (which came to include many Austrian elements), which 
may now come to an end or, what is more likely, will be continued with different means: 
drawing on behavioural, experimental, and neuroeconomics. As these are intersecting fields, 
it seems justified to simply speak of behavioural economics.19 On the one hand, behavioural 
economics considers experiments a key method in substantiating behavioural regularities, or 
‘anomalies’ from the viewpoint of rational choice. On the other hand, its quest for more 
realistic microfoundations for economic theory easily extends into exploring the (neuro-) 
biological foundations of behaviour.20 Mäki compares the methodological debate which the 
                                                        
15 Jürgen Backhaus and Reginald Hansen, ‘Methodenstreit in der Nationalökonomie’ (2000) Journal for General 
Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 307-336. 
16  Milan Zafirovski, ‘Sociological Dimensions in Classical/Neoclassical Economics: Conceptions of Social 
Economics and Economic Sociology’ (2014) Social Science Information 76-118, at 98. 
17 Gertraude Mikl-Horke, ‘Klassische Positionen der Ökonomie und Soziologie und ihre Bedeutung für die 
Wirtschaftssoziologie’ in Andrea Maurer (ed), Handbuch der Wirtschaftssoziologie (VS 2008) 19-44, at 26-28. 
18 Ibid., at 21. 
19 Arno Riedl, ‘Behavioural and Experimental Economics Do Inform Public Policy’ (2010) FinanzArchiv 65-95, 
at 67-69 and 89-90. 
20 Sanjit S. Dhami, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis (Oxford University Press 2016), ch. 23. 
 7 
advance of behavioural economics triggered to the classical ‘battle over methods’ of the late 
nineteenth century.21 This is the starting point for the following reconstruction of what is at 
stake in the current encounter between neoclassical and behavioural economics. 
 
The new battle over methods invokes the distinction between deductive and inductive 
approaches, which was already at issue in the original battle over methods. However, the 
frontlines have changed. In the late nineteenth century, the prevailing inductive approach to 
economics was challenged by a more deductive one. Today, the ‘new formalism’ of 
neoclassical economics is challenged by the ‘new realism’ of behavioural economics.22 But 
this is not all to it. The present methodological debate also relates to the dichotomy between 
positive and normative, which was the subject of the battle over value judgments about a 
hundred years ago. While both neoclassical and behavioural economics depict themselves as 
positive disciplines, they differ in their understanding of what this ‘positivism’ in the first 
place consists in: descriptive accuracy or predictive power. At the same time, both adhere to a 
higher or lesser degree to the normative ideal of rational decision-making, which economic 
policy may either presume or promote, by monetary incentives or behavioural nudges. To 
shed light on commonalities and differences between these two approaches, we will start 
from the methodological status of the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics. 
In the economic standard model, it is assumed that individual preferences are stable whereas 
the restrictions delimiting alternative ways of action are variable. Under the rationality 
assumption, the individual always chooses the utility-maximising option. This makes it 
technically possible to explain a change in behaviour (such as an increase in the consumption 
of a specific good) by a change in restrictions (such as a reduction of the market price of the 
respective good), and not a change in preferences. The rationality assumption plays a 
different role on the microeconomic and the macroeconomic level. On the microeconomic 
level, individual behaviour is explained by rational choice under given preferences and 
restrictions. On the macro-economic level, collective outcomes are explained by the 
aggregation of individual behaviours, again assuming that the latter can be modelled on 
rational action. However, there are different opinions as to whether macroeconomic theories 
                                                        
21 Uskali Mäki, ‘Preface’ in Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard and John Woods (eds), Philosophy of 
Economics (Elsevier 2012) xiii-xvii, at xiv. 
22 Cf. Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt 
a New Legal Theory?’ (2009) Cornell Law Review 61-137, at 64. 
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require a substantiation of the rationality assumption on the microeconomic level, or whether 
this microfoundation may have a hypothetical character only.23 
Milton Friedman’s essay on ‘The methodology of positive economics’,24 which is claimed to 
be ‘the most cited, the most influential, and the most controversial piece of methodological 
writing in 20th century economics’,25 prominently made a case for the latter. According to 
Friedman, the validity of a hypothesis entirely depends on its predictive capacity, and not on 
its descriptive accuracy. In other words, a theory has to be realistic in its predictions, and not 
in its assumptions. In fact, ‘[t]ruly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 
“assumptions” that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality’. 26 
Assumptions that are not claimed to be empirically correct but may nevertheless yield 
powerful empirical predictions can be referred to as ‘as if’ assumptions. Friedman illustrates 
this as follows: ‘under a wide range of circumstances individual firms behave as if they were 
seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns […] and had full knowledge of the data 
needed to succeed in this attempt’. 27  What he rejects, then, is realistic criticism of the 
assumptions rather than the predictions of neoclassical economics, ‘unless supplemented by 
evidence’ that more accurate assumptions also yield better predictions ‘for as wide a range of 
phenomena’.28 Friedman’s example refers to the theory of the firm, which makes use of the 
rationality assumption to model the behaviour of producers. The theory of the (private) 
household, which models the behaviour of consumers, starts from similar ‘as if’ assumptions. 
Arguably, in many cases these suffice to predict the behaviour of aggregates, which is at 
focus in macroeconomics. 
Drawing on this argument, attacks on the ‘psychological inaccuracy’ of neoclassical 
economic theories could be dismissed. Put differently, as long as the validity criterion of the 
rational choice approach is empirical, here specified as its predictive capacity, it is in line 
with scientific realism. 29  However, in defending axiomatic assumptions, the ‘as if’ 
methodology also resonates with the ‘formalist turn’ in economics, which is evident in an 
                                                        
23 Christian Etzrodt, Sozialwissenschaftliche Handlungstheorien: Eine Einführung (UVK 2003), at 14 and 24-
27. 
24 Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ in Milton Friedman (ed), Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago University Press 1953) 3-43. 
25  Uskali Mäki, ‘Reading the Methodological Essay in Twentieth Century Economics: Map of Multiple 
Perspectives’ in Uskali Mäki (ed), The Methodology of Positive Economics: Reflections on the Milton Friedman 
Legacy (Cambridge University Press 2009) 47-67, at 47. 
26 Friedman, ’Methodology of Positive Economics’ (n. 24 above), at 14. 
27 Ibid., at 21; original emphasis. 
28 Ibid., at 31. 
29 Uskali Mäki, ‘Realism and Antirealism About Economics’ in Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard 
and John Woods (eds), Philosophy of Economics (Elsevier 2012) 3-24, at 12-14. 
 9 
‘increased use of mathematics, abstraction, and deductive modes of reasoning’.30  In this 
sense, a ‘formalist’ approach still seems to yield a ‘realist’ methodology. However, this 
realism has its limits where the rationalistic microfoundations of neoclassical economics fail 
to account for the behaviour of aggregates, not to mention the individual behaviour of 
producers and consumers. Given these deficiencies of the rational choice approach, the aim 
of behavioural economics is ‘to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic 
theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations’.31  It starts from 
settings in which the ‘as if’ assumptions of neoclassical economics fail to adequately explain 
or predict actual behaviour. More specifically, it explores the cognitive biases and social 
orientations that make individuals deviate from the normative ideal of rational choice in order 
to construct more realistic models of economic action, which may then also feed into politics. 
 
While behavioural economics is more positivist in defining the microfoundations of the 
economic discipline, it is not necessarily less prescriptive, although the political lessons 
derived from behaviourally ‘enhanced’ economic models may differ from the policy 
implications of the neoclassical standard model. To demonstrate, we can once more take 
Friedman’s methodology essay as a point of departure, which is explicitly on ‘positive 
economics’.32  According to Friedman, positive economics ‘is, or can be, an “objective” 
science’ which is ‘in principle independent of any particular ethical position or normative 
judgments’. 33  The predictions and conclusions of positive economics can inform and 
eventually improve but not determine ‘policy conclusions’, which are the realm of ‘normative 
economics’, or ‘economic policy’.34 In this sense, Friedman draws on the legacy of the battle 
over value judgements, which established the difference between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and 
between ‘social science’ and ‘social policy’.35 However, the distinction between positive and 
normative economics is not all that clear. Hands suggest that self-proclaimed positive 
economists tend to equate ‘normative’ with ‘ethical’, or the ‘ethically normative’, while they 
overlook the normative standards inherent to economic theory.36 This namely concerns the 
                                                        
30 D. Wade Hands, ‘The Positive-Normative Dichotomy and Economics’ in Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul 
Thagard and John Woods (eds), Philosophy of Economics (Elsevier 2012) 219-239, at 509. 
31  Erik Angner and George Loewenstein, ‘Behavioral Economics’ in Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul 
Thagard and John Woods (eds), Philosophy of Economics (Elsevier 2012) 641-689, at 642. 
32 Friedman, ’Methodology of Positive Economics’ (n. 24 above). 
33 Ibid., at 4. 
34 Ibid., at 5-6. 
35 Cf. Max Weber, ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’ in Max Weber, The Methodology of Social 
Sciences (first published 1904, Free Press 1949) 49-112. 
36 Hands, ‘Positive-Normative Dichotomy’ (n. 30 above), at 225-227. 
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(axiomatic) assumption of rational choice, which is ‘neither a positive/descriptive theory of 
real economic agents, nor an ethical theory about what such agents ought to do’.37 Instead, it 
can better be understood as a normative principle of economic reasoning, which defines what 
it means to be rational. In this sense, it is not only an ‘as if’ assumption used for empirical 
predictions, but it is also a normative ideal meant to guide economic behaviour and to inform 
economic policy. 
In this regard, there is less of a difference between neoclassical and behavioural economics. 
Many of today’s behavioural economists criticize rational choice ‘as a positive or descriptive 
theory, not as a normative or prescriptive one’.38 Their aim is to demonstrate how people 
deviate from the rationality assumption, which serves as a null hypothesis to be refuted – or 
not – in empirical research.39  However, this does not necessarily mean that behavioural 
economists would also give up rationality as a normative ideal. To the contrary, if they 
succeed to explain rational choice as a special case in more general theories of behaviour40 – 
as the exception, and not as the rule – this may help to better understand the cognitive and 
contextual conditions enabling or ‘emulating’ rational economic action. Put differently, the 
insights gained from experimental studies may eventually help to turn the normative principle 
of rational choice into (institutionally assisted) behavioural practice. This is what governance 
by nudges is about. 
 
 
2. The rise of behavioural economics as (re)turn to psychology, not sociology or history 
 
The present methodological debate between behavioural and neoclassical economics thus 
seems to mirror the concerns of the classical battle over methods. However, it would be 
mistaken to think that the ‘new realism’ of behavioural economics would bring the holistic 
perspective of historical economics back in. A major difference between historical economics 
and behavioural economics can be captured in yet another dichotomy: between collectivism 
and individualism. Whereas historical economics was much interested in collective entities, 
such as the nation, neoclassical and behavioural economics share an emphasis on individual 
entities, even though they differ in how the microfoundations of macroeconomic phenomena 
are specified. In fact, behavioural economics seems to hold on to the methodological 
                                                        
37 Ibid., at 227. 
38 Angner and Loewenstein, ‘Behavioral Economics’ (n. 31 above), at 668. 
39 Ibid., at 680. 
40 Ibid., 
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individualism of neoclassical economics and, in particular, of rational choice theory. On this 
account, collectives are but aggregates of individuals and, the unintended consequences of 
individual behaviour notwithstanding, collective entities do not have a life or reality of their 
own. While historical economists were still interested in the ‘spirit of the nation’, neoclassical 
and behavioural economists are mostly interested in the mindset of individuals. However, 
whereas neoclassical economics starts from axiomatic assumptions about rational action, 
behavioural economics has a genuine interest in human psychology. Arguably, this makes its 
individualist tendencies even more pronounced. This is only counteracted in explicitly 
interactionist accounts of social behaviour. 
To be sure, a return to historical economics is not the alternative promoted here. What is of 
more interest, from a sociological point of view, is how behavioural economics relates to 
‘social economics’, which is already an old concept, and ‘socio-economics’, which is a more 
contemporary term. It has been held that much of classical economics in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century could be qualified as social economics since economic science and social 
policy were still closely interlinked at that time.41 However, the term as such emerged in the 
nineteenth century and assumed almost opposite meanings in different contexts.42 It thus 
likewise came to be used by liberal economists, who understood the economic discipline not 
as a policy-oriented science of the state, but as a general social science focusing on 
individuals and their interaction,43 and by social reformers interested in furthering a ‘social 
economy’ based on relations of solidarity and cooperation, a political project motivated by ‘a 
radical critique of individualist liberalism and the effects of early industrial capitalism’.44 
However, the reference point chosen here is yet a different one. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, scholars like Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter defended social economics as an 
integrated view of economy and society against the increasing differentiation of economic 
theory from economic history and economic sociology.45 Thus understood, the concept stands 
for a scientific and not a political project; it is about social science and not social policy. Our 
argument is that behavioural economics is far from reviving this integrative project, since it is 
much less inspired by (economic) sociology, not to mention (economic) history, than by 
                                                        
41  Reinhold Hedtke, ‘Was ist und wozu Sozioökonomie?’ in Reinhold Hedtke (ed), Was ist und wozu 
Sozioökonomie? (VS 2015) 19-69, at 20. 
42 Gertraude Mikl-Horke, ‘Traditionen, Problemstellungen und Konstitutionsprobleme der Sozioökonomie’ in 
Reinhold Hedtke (ed), Was ist und wozu Sozioökonomie? (VS 2015) 95-123, at 96-98. 
43 Ibid., at 97. 
44 Ibid., at 97; my translation. 
45 Andrea Maurer, ‘Sozioökonomie’ in Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon (18th edn, Springer Gabler Verlag 2014) 
<http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Archiv/611744017/soziooekonomie-v2.html> accessed 5 August 2017. 
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(economic) psychology. It thus lacks the possibility to reflect on broader economic 
developments, both in theory and in practice, and to take a self-reflective stance with regard 
to its own role in shaping them. 
 
Since psychology is also a science of the social, even though it may start from the individual, 
we first have to get a better of understanding what kind of psychology behavioural economics 
draws upon to provide more realistic ‘microfoundations’ for economic theory. Occasionally, 
the turn to psychology has been depicted as a ‘return to the roots of neoclassical economics 
after a century-long detour’.46 In fact, earlier versions of the model of economic man, or 
homo economicus, were still imbued with psychological concepts.47 In Giocoli’s words: ‘The 
traditional subject of neoclassical economics was the behavior of the “real” homo economicus 
in his flesh and blood (i.e., in his tastes, motives and desires), actuated by the force of self-
interest.’ 48  Accordingly, it has been argued that ‘both classical and early neoclassical 
economists were deeply interested in the psychological underpinnings of economic 
behavior’. 49  An example is the pleasure-and-pain principle, which can be considered a 
cornerstone of early-neoclassical theorising. However, by the mid-twentieth century, 
references to ‘hedonic psychology’ had largely disappeared. 50  This is evident in the 
conceptual move from a subjective concept of utility, which is based on individual 
assessments and expressed in cardinal terms, to an objective concept of preference, which is 
based on aggregate observations and expressed in ordinal terms.51 This seminal step towards 
‘revealed preference theory’ allowed postwar neoclassical economics to do away with any 
references to human psychology. 
On the one hand, this strictly empirical definition of preferences seems to be in line with the 
emergence of behaviourism in the first half of the twentieth century,52  which has to be 
distinguished from the ‘behavioural’ or ‘cognitive’ turn that came to define today’s 
behavioural economics. Indeed, what the ‘behaviourist revolution’ was all about was to 
                                                        
46  Colin F. Camerer and George Loewenstein, ‘Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future’ in Colin F. 
Camerer, George Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin (eds), Advances in Behavioral Economics (Princeton 
University Press 2004) 3-51, at 5. 
47 Mary S. Morgan, ‘The Character of “Rational Economic Man”’ (1996) London School of Economics and 
Political Science, Working Papers in Economic History No. 34/96 < http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22412/1/34_96.pdf> 
accessed 5 August 2017. 
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substitute mental states, which were considered merely subjective, with observable 
behaviours, which could be objectively measured. On the other hand, the concept of revealed 
preferences allowed the economic discipline not only to do away with speculations about 
inner states and feelings, but to become ‘a social science independent of any foundations in 
individual psychology’.53 Real economic man was replaced with the fiction of a ‘perfectly 
logical agent’.54 And rationality was no longer equated with the reasoned pursuit of self-
interest but with behaviour that is consistent with the order of preferences – whatever these 
may be.55 As Ross argues, the conceptual emancipation of economics from psychology was, 
at the same time, an opportunity to move beyond the methodological individualism with 
which the neoclassical mainstream is often identified.56 A less individualist and, in this sense, 
more collectivist orientation of economic theorising was evident in the ‘then-new 
[Keynesian] macroeconomics’ of the Bretton Woods era. 57  Again, the point is that 
macroeconomic theories, which are about ‘emergent systems of production, consumption and 
exchange’,58 do not necessarily require psychologically accurate microfoundations. Instead, 
these can be construed ‘in strictly economic terms, where “economic” is defined by reference 
to an axiomatic theoretical system for identifying equilibria among behavioral dispositions or 
strategies of agents’.59 In other words, ‘as if’ assumptions, such as of rational economic 
action, only bring the economic model to a ‘close’. 
Returning to the roots of neoclassical economics eventually means abandoning this path. 
Human psychology is brought back in, albeit under the new premise of the ‘cognitive 
revolution’, which set the focus on information processing. Indeed, much of today’s 
behavioural economics draws on cognitive psychology, which became prominent in the 
second half of the twentieth century, and in particular on ‘behavioural decision research’. 
Developing in the 1970s, the aim of this field was ‘to identify the common set of cognitive 
skills, their benefits and limitations’ in human decision-making, and ‘to explore how they 
help produce observable behavior, whether optimal or not’.60 With the emphasis being on the 
study of cognitive processes, it would also be possible to refer to behavioural economics as 
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‘cognitive economics’.61 In fact, these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but they 
may also refer to different strands of scholarship.62 
Given that the subjects of cognitive enquiries in behavioural economics are typically human 
beings, the story of the rediscovery of the psychological underpinnings of economic action 
can also be told in different terms: as a return of the human individual to the heart of 
economic theorising. This point deserves emphasis since the abstract economic agent 
envisioned in neoclassical economics cannot be equated with concrete human beings. In other 
words, taking homo economicus for real means to commit the ‘fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness’. This is highlighted by Ross: ‘The contemporary concept of the agent is 
primarily a theoretical construction that facilitates modeling of aggregate phenomena; and it 
does a better job of this then would an agent fleshed out according to the profile of the human 
being furnished by psychologists.’63 Hence, there is a fundamental difference between the 
‘constructed artifacts’ of neoclassical economics and the ‘natural objects’ of behavioural 
economics.64 The neoclassical homo economicus exists but in theory. It is an exemplary, 
hypothetical or statistical entity; ‘a reference point for ascription of a utility function’, which 
does not have a life of its own.65 This includes collective actors, such as firms, households, 
and countries, which can easily be referred to as economic agents, but are not identical with 
individual human beings. In contrast, behavioural economics equates the economic agent 
with natural persons, concrete individuals, living organisms. With the behavioural, or 
cognitive, turn, the methodological individualism of mainstream economics thus becomes 
ontological. Behavioural economics is interested in individuals as they really are, and not in 
their rational choice abstractions. It is in this sense, that the new field is more individualist in 
orientation than its neoclassical counterpart. However, this finding requires qualification in 




3. The methodological differences between ‘cognitive’ and ‘social’ behavioural economics 
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Behavioural economics has become a brand for various types of enquiry into how ‘real 
humans’ deviate from the rationality assumption connected with the neoclassical model of 
economic man. From a socio-economic point of view, it is of particular interest in what form 
and to what extent psychologically enhanced conceptions of homo economicus take account 
of the social influences shaping individual economic action and thus also respond to the quest 
for integrated models of socio-economic man. The aim of such models has been to enrich 
homo economicus in sociological terms, or to bridge the gap between homo economicus and 
homo sociologicus. 66  Given that behavioural economics is, first of all, ‘inspired by 
psychology’, even though it is conceded that there ‘may be much to learn from sociology, 
anthropology, and other neighboring fields’ as well,67 the projects of ‘psychologising’ or 
‘sociologising’ economic man obviously do not enjoy the same rank in the discipline. 
However, some areas of research score higher in combining these agendas than others. The 
question of what is the ‘social’ in behavioural economics can thus be answered differently for 
different strands of scholarship. 
As Zarri argues, ‘far from being a monolithic theory’, behavioural economics ‘consists of two 
different “souls”’,68 which stand for two different ways of dealing with apparent deviations 
from the rationality assumption of the neoclassical model. The first strand of scholarship, 
which is referred to as the ‘cognitive component’ of behavioural economics, focuses on 
‘major cognitive limitations and systematic biases in decision-making affecting economic 
behaviour’.69 Research in this field is concerned with ‘various forms of cognitive limitations 
and behavioral biases’ that may affect individual decision-making, including, among others, 
‘framing effects, self-control problems, overconfidence, status quo bias and projection 
bias’. 70  For Zarri, the neoclassical model is inherently connected with the ‘self-interest 
hypothesis’, that is, ‘the assumption that economic agents are systematically driven by the 
pursuit of material self-interest’. 71  However, as we have seen above, such a ‘thick’ 
conception of rationality is not necessarily what contemporary neoclassical economics starts 
from. This is conceded by other behavioural economists: ‘The [neoclassical] theory does not 
say that people are selfish, materialistic, or greedy’.72 What is technically supposed, though, 
is the assumption of ‘full’ rationality in terms of consistent utility-maximising behaviour. 
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This important nuance notwithstanding, Zarri suggests that the cognitive component of 
behavioural economics differs from the neoclassical mainstream in that it addresses 
phenomena of ‘bounded’ rationality while it retains the assumption of ‘egoistic’, or self-
regarding, preferences.73 
The second strand of scholarship discussed by Zarri is qualified as the ‘social component’ of 
behavioural economics and characterized by an interest in situations in which individuals 
manifest not only self-regarding but also other-regarding preferences.74 The main instrument 
to study deviations from the assumption of rational self-interest in empirical research is 
behavioural game theory, which uses experimental ‘interaction scenarios’ to show that 
‘behavioral choices by individual agents […] can (either positively or negatively) be affected 
by other players’ preferences, material well-being, intentions and/or behavioral choices’.75 
According to Zarri, the inclusion of social, or other-regarding, preferences in economic 
models contradicts the self-interest assumption associated with neoclassical economics while 
it is not necessarily in conflict with the rational choice approach as such. Indeed, his aim is to 
demonstrate ‘that modelling sociality via social preferences […] is compatible with the 
classic notion of rationality as “internal consistency”’. 76  In other words, for Zarri the 
distinctive element of the social component of behavioural economics both with regard to the 
cognitive component of behavioural economics and with regard to neoclassical economics is 
a ‘thin’ conception of rationality. However, if one acknowledges that much of neoclassical 
economics, including (analytical) game theory, does not subscribe to the ‘selfishness axiom’, 
the findings of behavioural game theory make less of a difference. The problem is that 
modelling becomes more complex the more the dynamic of social interaction is taken into 
account,77 which includes mutually-contingent behaviour such as reciprocation.78 
 
While Zarri’s argument may be flawed (or, at least, misleading) with regard to the state of the 
art of neoclassical economics and the role of ‘as if’ assumptions, it nonetheless helps to 
distinguish between different strands of scholarship in behavioural economics with regard to 
their views of the individual and the social. In a nutshell, behavioural economics thus 
combines a cognitive component, which focuses on the cognitive biases of self-interested but 
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boundedly rational individuals, with a social component, which is interested in the social 
preferences that more broadly rational individuals manifest in situations of strategic 
interaction. What one can derive from this distinction is that in concentrating on technically 
isolated individuals with self-regarding preferences, the cognitive component of behavioural 
economics is more individualist than the social component, whose behavioural models take 
account of interacting individuals with interdependent (self-regarding as well as other-
regarding) preferences. Hence, the two strands of scholarship differ in their conceptions of 
the ‘social’, which is implicit in the former approach and explicit in the latter. As to the 
cognitive component of behavioural economics, individual cognitive biases and behavioural 
rigidities do not necessarily have to be ‘hard-wired’, but they may also be influenced by the 
social environment, which likewise shapes individual cognition and behaviour. However, this 
possibility appears to be neglected in respective scholarship. In contrast, the social 
component of behavioural economics is evidently interested in the social conditions of 
individual behaviour and the social dynamic of strategic interaction, albeit its conception of 
the ‘social’ is somewhat truncated by its commitment to game-theoretic models and the 
rational choice approach. Of main interest in this area of scholarship are the workings of 
social norms or preferences in interactive situations in which individuals respond to the 
anticipated or observed reactions of other players. Interestingly, the (more explicitly) social 
strand of behavioural economics seems less visible in normative debates about the policy 
relevance of behavioural findings, whereas the political implications of the cognitive strand 
are widely discussed. Arguably, the divergence in political attractiveness and/or applicability 
of the two strands of behavioural economics directly reflects the observed variance in the 
social complexity of their underlying models. 
 
Against this backdrop, we can refine our above argument and claim that scholars in the 
cognitive component of behavioural economics are more prone than scholars in the social 
component to interpret the methodological individualism associated with mainstream 
economics and the rational choice approach also in ontological terms: by focusing on 
boundedly rational individuals, with very limited regard to their social environment. 
However, in the methodological debate with neoclassical economics this downside of a more 
‘realistic’ view of economic man is rarely seen. This is evident in Tomer’s ‘stereotypical’ 
comparison of behavioural economics with mainstream economics, in which the latter is 
characterized by its ‘narrowness’, ‘rigidity’, ‘intolerance’, ‘mechanicalness’, ‘separateness’, 
 18 
and ‘individualism’.79 By ‘narrowness’, Tomer refers to the formalistic-deductive approach 
of neoclassical economics and its axiomatic assumptions, among which he includes 
‘rationality, self-interest, and self-control’.80 ‘Rigidity’ and ‘intolerance’ are related to the 
defence of a narrow approach, whereas ‘mechanicalness’ refers to the use of ‘machine-like 
metaphors and concepts such as equilibrium’ to describe the economy, in contrast to 
conceiving it ‘as an organic, holistic, evolving, human entity’.81 More relevant, in the present 
context, are the remaining attributes: ‘separateness’, which refers to the closure of the 
economic discipline with regard to ‘noneconomic disciplines, especially social science 
disciplines’,82 and ‘individualism’. The latter criterion is introduced as follows: ‘A discipline 
high on individualism is one where explanations invariably focus on individual decision-
making behavior. A discipline low on individualism gives much more consideration to 
individuals as part of collectivities as well as social and group motivations and behavior.’83 In 
practice, Tomer connects the label of high individualism with a rational choice approach that 
is characterized by a ‘thick’ conception of rationality based on self-interested preferences. 
According to Zarri, the assumption of self-interest would be shared by neoclassical 
economics and the cognitive component of behavioural economics,84  while according to 
many neoclassical economists, the discipline nowadays starts from a ‘thin’ conception of 
rationality, which allows including other-regarding preferences in individual utility functions. 
In this sense, today’s mainstream economics is lower in individualism than Tomer suggests, 
who considers a relatively low degree of individualism a distinctive characteristic of 
behavioural economics. Accordingly, ‘psychological economics’, by which he refers to ‘the 
strand of [behavioral economics] that borrows from psychology, especially cognitive 
psychology’, could be considered ‘much less individualistic than [mainstream economics], as 
[its] practitioners […] recognize that behavior may not be self-interested or strictly rational, 
and they recognize important social influences on individual decision making’. 85 
Distinguishing between the two strands of behavioural economics identified above, one 
would actually arrive at a different conclusion: that the cognitive component of behavioural 
economics is actually higher in individualism than neoclassical economics while the social 
component of behavioural economics is lower, since the latter not only reserves a place for 
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social preferences in individual utility functions but makes them the very subject of enquiry. 
It may be contested at what point the rational choice approach, which is occasionally itself 
depicted as ‘social economics’, 86  reaches its limits in accommodating the ‘social’. 87 
However, from a socio-economic perspective it is clear that the social component of 
behavioural economics comes much closer to ‘sociologising’ economic man than the 
cognitive component, which is obviously more concerned with ‘psychologising’ economic 
man with relatively little regard to the social. In Lindenberg’s original version of socio-
economic man, the emphasis was on bridging economic and sociological models of man, and 
explicitly not on tying in psychological conceptions.88 His argument was that economics and 
sociology share, as social-scientific disciplines, that their ‘main task is to analyze social 
systems’, for which they ‘make use of theories of action’, and that their interest in the 
individual is only instrumental.89 In contrast, psychology is individualist not only in its means 
but also in its ends. Hence, ‘different requirements are placed on the “individual” theories in 
psychology on the one hand and in economics and sociology on the other’. 90  Indeed, 
Lindenberg was still able to claim, a quarter of a century ago, that ‘it is very unlikely that a 
homo socio-economicus will consist of a psychological behavioral theory’.91 Drawing on the 
above, we could conclude that this is still the case, but that there is a split between two 
conceptions of economic man in behavioural economics: one informed by bridging 
economics and (some sort of) psychology in the cognitive component of behavioural 
economics and one informed by bridging economics and (some sort of) sociology in the 
social component of behavioural economics. 
The latter model of socio-economic man is evident in Fehr and Gintis’s integrated approach, 
which regards homo economicus and homo sociologicus as ‘special cases’.92 Whereas the 
former is considered as ‘rational and purely self-regarding’, an asocial egoist, the latter is 
pictured as a social conformist, who ‘follows prevailing social norms without regard to self-
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interest’.93 Again, the rational choice approach is taken as a useful framework to combine the 
two concepts, with rationality being interpreted in terms of consistency only and not being 
equated with self-interest. In a more recent paper, Gintis and Helbing coined the term ‘homo 
socialis’ for an analytical species that not only includes aspects of economic man and 
sociological man but also draws on behavioural insights gained from ‘laboratory and field 
experimentation into choice and social interaction’. 94  While informed by sociological 
theories, the rationale behind this integrative endeavour is, once more, to formulate a 
generalized model of economic man, in which internalized social norms appear as ‘arguments 
in the preference function that the individual maximizes’. 95  This ‘broadened version of 
rational decision theory’ is combined with the ‘general economic equilibrium model’ to 
calculate effects on the aggregate level.96 Overall, this model is still much in line with the 
conventions of mainstream economics and will therefore be of limited appeal to the latter’s 
more sociologically minded critics. What will be addressed next is, therefore, how the realist 
contenders of neoclassical economics came to be organized in different, if partly overlapping, 
movements, one of which is behavioural economics whereas the other is known as ‘socio-
economics’ (and at least partly harkens back to old ideas of ‘social economics’). 
 
 
4. The institutional separation of the fields of behavioural economics and socio-economics 
 
Behavioural economics and socio-economics have shared roots in their opposition to 
neoclassical mainstream economics and can be understood as different branches of 
‘heterodox’ economics.97 It is thus no coincidence that the leading academic associations in 
both fields, the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE) and the 
Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE), almost have the same names. 
However, some scholars still use the terms behavioural economics and socio-economics 
interchangeably or include the one in the other. Indeed, the two movements have only 
become differentiated in the last few decades. This is evident in the development of their 
respective institutional cores and flagship journals. 
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To reconstruct this development we can start from the Journal of Behavioral Economics 
(JBE), which was founded in 1971 ‘to encourage interdisciplinary research which brought 
economics together with the other social sciences and the applied business disciplines’.98 The 
journal’s first editor was, and basically remained over thirty years, Richard Hattwick.99 The 
editorial of the JBE’s ‘demonstration issue’ in 1972 describes the mission of the new journal 
as follows: ‘The Journal of Behavioral Economics seeks to (1) further knowledge of real 
world economic phenomena by integrating psychological and sociological variables into 
economic analysis and (2) promote interdisciplinary work among economists, psychologists, 
sociologists, political scientists and scholars working in business school disciplines.’100 What 
is referred to as behavioural economics here could as well be described as socio-economics. 
Moreover, there is no perceivable trade-off between psychology and sociology in enriching 
economic analysis yet. 
Ten years later, in 1982, SABE was founded ‘by a group of scholars, mostly economists, who 
were in a variety of ways dissatisfied with mainstream economics’, on the side of a meeting 
of the Allied Social Sciences Association in New York.101 Among the founding members 
were, amongst others, Herbert Simon, whose concept of bounded rationality made him a 
pioneer of behavioural economics,102 and George Akerlof, whose work has been labelled as 
‘behavioural macroeconomics’,103 as well as Richard Thaler.104 Thaler later became one of 
the figureheads of the popularization of behavioural economics and ‘libertarian paternalism’ 
through the bestseller Nudge, which he co-authored with Cass Sunstein.105 The first SABE 
conference in 1984 included the cognitive psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, whose writings on heuristics, biases and framing effects had inspired Thaler’s 
early work on ‘anomalies’ in economic decision-making,106 which shows that consumers 
often do not live up to the normative assumptions of the rational choice model.107 Since 1986, 
SABE has held Joint Meetings with the International Association for Research in Economic 
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Psychology.108 Thaler’s ‘first major contribution to behavioural economics’109 was published 
in the very first issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (JEBO) in 
1980, which would become ‘by far the most-cited journal’ in the field, followed by the 
Journal of Economic Psychology (JEP), founded in 1981. 110  However, the journal that 
entered into ‘a formal relationship’ with SABE, at the initiative of the latter, in 1988, was the 
‘older’ JBE.111 
In 1989, seven years after SABE, SASE was founded at the end of a conference organized to 
discuss Amitai Etzioni’s The Moral Dimension,112 which had just been published.113 Etzioni 
became the first president of the new organization, which started from a ‘minimum platform’ 
of socio-economic principles, and from the outset included ‘[a] large variety of viewpoints 
and perspectives’. 114  In this respect, it differs from the older Association for Social 
Economics, which came into being as Catholic Economic Association, that is, a professional 
organization based on Catholic social doctrine, and which only later opened up for other 
theoretical traditions,115 while it kept a strong focus on normative questions of human dignity 
and social justice.116 In contrast, the programmatic statement of SASE reflects a broader, 
social-scientific approach to the economy: ‘Socio-economics assumes that economics is 
embedded in society, polity and culture, and is not a self-contained system. It assumes that 
individual choices are shaped by values, emotions, social bonds, and judgments – rather than 
by a precise calculation of self-interest.’117 SASE had originally planned to launch a Journal 
of Socio-Economics (JSE) next to the JBE,118 but this did not materialize. As a ‘backup plan’ 
SASE turned to the JBE and suggested to change the name of the journal.119 The JBE’s editor 
Hattwick sympathized with Etzioni’s initiative and included members of the newly created 
SASE in his editorial board. In 1991, the title of the journal indeed was changed from JBE to 
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JSE. However, Hattwick’s intention was not to play out one organization against the other; 
instead, he thought that ‘[t]he JSE would continue to serve SABE and would not be an 
official journal of SASE’.120 
Etzioni’s initiative was much less appreciated by SABE members. On the webpage of the 
2007 SABE Conference, which includes a retrospective of the development of the 
organization, it is stated that ‘Etzioni […] opportunistically took the wind out of SABE sails 
in the process of bringing a new organization, the [SASE], into existence’.121 Tomer, who 
had been a founding member of SABE in 1982, refers to this as the ‘transformation’ of SABE 
into SASE, which was ‘oriented more toward noneconomic social science scholars, 
especially sociologists, not economists’.122 It was also Tomer who decided to breathe new life 
into SABE after its ‘near death experience’ in the early 1990s.123 Tomer drew his motivation 
from the fact that ‘some SASE economists were unhappy with the position of behavioral 
economics in SASE’.124  When the SABE was ‘officially re-established’ in 1992,125  with 
Tomer as its new president, behavioural economics and socio-economics started to bifurcate 
in organizational terms. At the same time, some scholars, including Tomer, remained 
members of both organizations. 
Somewhat ironically, the JSE, formerly JBE, ‘again became affiliated with SABE’ in the 
1990s. 126  However, at the tenth birthday of SASE in 1991, the journal was still also 
considered an organ of the latter, even though Etzioni depicted its records as ‘quite poor, 
publishing many papers irrelevant to socio-economics and weak ones to boot’.127 In the same 
year, the long-standing editor, Hattwick, underlined, on his part, that the journal served as a 
platform for all kind of scholarship in the ‘socio-economics movement’, the ‘leading 
professional organizations’ of which were SABE, SASE and the Socio-economics Section of 
the Association of American Law Schools (which eventually published its own journal – the 
Journal of Law and Socio-Economics – between 1997 and 2007).128 
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In the same piece, Hattwick outlined three ‘paradigms’, or ‘visions’, of socio-economics, 
which he termed ‘Psychological Socio-Economics’, ‘Sociological Socio-Economics’ and 
‘Humanistic and Holistic Socio-Economics’.129 Accordingly, psychological socio-economics 
is based on mainstream economics ‘but replaces the assumption of economic man with the 
richer concept of psychological man’. 130  While mitigating the rationality assumption, it 
retains the relatively narrow focus of (mainstream) economics on the economy as an 
independent system and on questions of utility maximization. 131  Sociological socio-
economics is depicted as a more encompassing paradigm, which ‘incorporates all of the first 
vision, but adds a strong emphasis on issues of equity, justice and community as well as a 
focus on social institutions and their impact on the economy’.132 Whereas the interaction of 
economy and society is key to all sociologically oriented approaches to socio-economics, a 
more specific interest in social values and communitarian aspects of ‘balancing I and we’ is 
prominently connected with Etzioni’s approach.133 Finally, the humanistic vision of socio-
economics would span all scientific disciplines, from ‘biology’ to the ‘humanities’, and focus 
on ‘[i]nteracting and evolving social and natural systems’. 134  Interestingly, Hattwick 
prioritizes neither the first nor the second vision for the future development of the journal but 
announces that ‘[i]n times of extreme scarcity of space, priority will be given to the frame of 
reference represented by Vision 3’.135 
In reality, the development was different. Close to retirement, Hattwick ‘originally thought’ 
to find the journal’s new editor-to-be from SASE.136 At the same time ‘several commercial 
publishers were anxious to buy the journal’, which was ultimately sold to Elsevier.137 In 
2001, Morris Altman became the new editor of the JSE, with Tomer as co-editor. Altman 
was, like Tomer, ‘co-founder of the resuscitated SABE in 1992’, served as its president 1992-
2003, and as a board member 1982-2013.138 It is thus likely that the journal became more 
aligned with SABE’s interests under Altman, who remained its editor until 2012, even though 
Altman was also involved with SASE. The result was ‘a big jump’ in the number of citations 
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of the journal, which now came to be ranked third after JEBO and JEP in the (combined) 
field of behavioural economics and socio-economics.139 
On the socio-economic side, these developments created both space and need for a new outlet 
covering the broader research interests of SASE members. In 2003, the Socio-Economic 
Review (SER) was launched to further ‘dialogue among a wide and inclusive range of the 
various communities interested in the economy’ and to stimulate ‘work on the relationship 
between society, economy, institutions and markets, moral commitments and the rational 
pursuit of self-interest’.140 Wolfgang Streeck, chief editor of the SER between 2006 and 
2012, laid emphasis on ‘the socio-political content of the economy’.141 Accordingly, socio-
economics is concerned with ‘how the economy is or should be supported and constrained, or 
governed, by social relations, political decisions, and cultural values’ as much as in ‘how the 
economy in turn affects the society of which it is part, dissolving old forms of social 
institutions, and giving rise to new ones’.142 In 2013, incoming editor Gregory Jackson noted 
that economics ‘has turned more strongly to psychology (e.g. behavioral economics) and law 
(e.g. ‘law and economics’) rather than sociology or political science’, 143 while he saw ‘a 
particular strength’ of the SER precisely ‘in its disciplinary breadth across sociology, political 
science, economics and the management and policy sciences’.144 As to its impact factor, the 
journal indeed ranks relatively high in political science and sociology but also in economics. 
While SASE is now firmly linked with the SER, the journal associated with SABE, which 
had for almost twenty years been known as JBE and for more than twenty years as JSE, was 
once more changed. In 2013, the new editor Ofer Azar, who was a board member of SABE 
2006-2014 and also served as its president 2012-2014, still invited ‘submissions that deal 
with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, 
such as psychology and sociology’, with ‘contributions in behavioral economics, economic 
psychology, experimental economics, socio-economics, and judgment and decision making’ 
being especially welcome.145 However, one year later, the title of the journal was changed to 
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. Azar gives the reason as follows: ‘The 
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recent scope of the journal and the way I see it moving forward led me and others to think 
that the new title […] better captures the journal’s content.’146 Thus, the ‘JSE’s vision of 
disciplinary inclusiveness’147 ultimately seems to have given way to greater confinement to 
behavioural economics. The bifurcation in the names and agendas of the two professional 




5. The incipient battle over methods between behavioural economics and socio-economics 
 
According to SASE founder Etzioni, ‘[t]he term “socio” in socio-economics does not stand 
for sociology; it includes major segments of psychology and anthropology, history, and 
political science – the whole complex of disciplines that [examine] the relationships between 
society and the economy’.148 To be sure, socio-economics also includes sociology, but the 
latter does not ‘monopolize’ the field, to the exclusion of other social-scientific disciplines.149 
However, from the perspective of Tomer, who had taken initiative to revive SABE a few 
years after the formation of SASE, the latter was clearly drifting towards sociology: ‘In its 
infancy, the socio-economics of SASE was very much multi-disciplinary (sociology, 
economics, psychology, organizational behavior, anthropology, etc.), but today socio-
economics is generally acknowledged to be an interdisciplinary endeavor carried out largely 
by sociologists.’150 This indicates that behavioural economics and socio-economics are not 
only perceived as distinctive enterprises but that there is also potential for a new – or 
continued – battle over methods between the two. However, this remains somewhat hidden, 
since both academic movements have so far been preoccupied with distinguishing themselves 
from neoclassical mainstream economics. 
Classifying the considerable number of ‘heterodox’ approaches that developed in opposition 
to ‘orthodox’ neoclassical economics, Davis distinguishes between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ 
heterodoxy. 151  Traditional heterodox approaches developed outside the neoclassical 
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mainstream, to which they aim to provide alternatives, often ‘based on closer ties to, and less 
sharp boundaries with, sociology, history, politics and anthropology’.152 Examples of this 
kind of scholarship are ‘(old) institutional economics’, ‘Marxist economics (and radical 
economics)’, ‘post Keynesian economics’, ‘social economics and socio-economics’, ‘feminist 
economics’, and ‘post-modernist economics’. 153  In contrast, behavioural economics, 
experimental economics and neuroeconomics are classified as new heterodox approaches, 
which aim to reform neoclassical thinking and thereby also redefine what the mainstream 
is.154 Davis also speaks of ‘mainstream heterodoxy’ in this respect, which may eventually 
become the ‘new orthodoxy’. He explores to what extent this mainstream heterodoxy shares 
the ‘substantive principles’ of traditional heterodoxy, such as that ‘[i]ndividuals are socially 
embedded rather than atomistic’ and that ‘[i]ndividuals and social-economic structures are 
mutually influencing’. 155  What he finds is that the new heterodox approaches are 
characterized by a rather ‘mild adoption’ of these principles.156 Even though they suggest ‘a 
genuine departure from neoclassical rational choice microfoundations thinking’, their 
macrocontextualization of individual action and behaviour still remains underdeveloped. In 
other words, the social is conceived in an ‘abstract’, ‘formal’ and ‘positivistic’ manner.157 
In a recent contribution, Hedtke lists a plethora of dichotomies for the divergent research 
perspectives and methodologies of mainstream economics and socio-economics, such as: 
reductionism vs. complexity; asociality vs. sociality; disembeddedness vs. embeddedness; 
universalism vs. historicity; linearity vs. circularity; instrumental rationality vs. multi-
motivationality; individualism vs. culturalism; naturalism vs. constructivism; mechanics vs. 
evolution; anti-realism vs. realism; positivism vs. normativity; monism vs. pluralism.158 
Hollingsworth and Müller (2008) contrast two scientific paradigms, called ‘Science I’ and 
‘Science II’. 159  Science I is the conventional paradigm, which is reductionist in its 
orientation: ‘societies are believed to be built up from individuals, individuals from cells and 
their neural organization, cells from molecules, molecules from atoms, etc.’.160 Science II is a 
more novel paradigm, which aims at the analysis of complex systems and is premised on the 
                                                        
152 Ibid., at 360. 
153 Ibid., at 359. 
154 Ibid., at 354. 
155 Ibid., at 360. 
156 Ibid., at 362. 
157 Ibid., at 361-362. 
158 Cf. Hedtke, ‘Was ist und wozu Sozioökonomie?’ (n. 41 above), at 41. 
159 Rogers Hollingsworth and Karl H. Müller, ‘Transforming Socio-Economics With a New Epistemology’ 
(2008) Socio-Economic Review 395-426. 
160 Ibid., at 397. 
 28 
idea that ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’.161 If mainstream economics is firmly 
rooted in the conventional paradigm, socio-economics has clear affinities with the alternative 
paradigm. An example of the latter is multi-level analysis, which takes bottom-up effects as 
seriously as top-down effects.162 
Going one step further, Zafirovski analysed classical and neoclassical economics for implicit 
or explicit inclusion of ‘sociological dimensions’, that is, elements that go beyond economic 
reasoning in the narrow sense. 163  These sociological elements are referred to as ‘social 
economics’ or even ‘economic sociology’, but they may also include social applications of 
the rational choice paradigm. What Zafirovski finds is that for a broad sample of classical or 
neoclassical scholars sociological considerations did play a role and ‘consist primarily of 
conceptions and elements of social economics or economic sociology as the sociological 
approach to economy and, only secondarily, of rational choice theory as the economics of 
society’. 164  Interestingly, he thus employs a triangular approach to distinguish different 
‘sociologically informed’ approaches not only from ‘pure’ economics but also from each 
other. This distinction between two different ways to include the ‘social’ in economic 
reasoning can already be found in an earlier text where Zafirovski explicitly addressed the 
relation between socio-economics and rational choice theory.165 In that piece, rational choice 
theory is defined as a ‘micro-economic approach to society, which assumes utilitarian 
determination of all social life’, whereas socio-economics is characterized as a ‘macro-social 
approach to the economy, positing societal structuration of economic behaviour’.166 Like 
Hedtke, Zafirovski resorts to a number of dichotomies to distinguish the two approaches, 
such as: univariate vs. multivariate; monism vs. pluralism; reductionism vs. realism; non-
institutionalism vs. institutionalism; social vacuum vs. embeddedness; atomism vs. holism.167 
While these dichotomies may also be helpful to specify the relation between behavioural 
economics and socio-economics, this is not what Zafirovski originally had in mind, and some 
of the labels (such as univariate models, economic monism, utilitarian reductionism) cannot 
be applied as easily to behavioural ‘extensions’ of the rational choice paradigm as to its more 
analytical versions, precisely because the more ‘realistic’ models of behavioural economics 
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do include non-rational factors. What is clear, though, is that socio-economics, as understood 
by Zafirovski, still stands out in terms of its ‘institutional realism’, which lays emphasis on 
the constitutive effects of social institutions, and its ‘methodological holism’, according to 
which the dynamics of social collectives cannot be reduced to the (rational or irrational) 
decisions of individuals.168 The latter methodological position can also be referred to as to as 
‘methodological culturalism’ or ‘methodological constructivism’,169 which contrasts not only 
with the commitment to methodological individualism which is evident in the rational choice 
paradigm, but also with the meta-scientific principles of (scientific) realism, positivism or 
naturalism. These describe a distinctly ‘empiricist’ orientation, to which much of behavioural 
economics subscribes, while many adherents of a ‘science of culture’170 would consider this 
too narrow an approach. Considering both its cognitive and social components, one can thus 
conclude that behavioural economics is still much higher on individualism, naturalism or 
positivism and much lower on institutionalism, culturalism or constructivism than a 
genuinely sociological approach. 
 
However, the debate between socio-economists or economic sociologists on the one hand and 
behavioural economists on the other is still in its infancy. Few socio-economists or economic 
sociologists directly engage with behavioural economics, even though its relevance has been 
highlighted in recent overviews171 and reference works172 of the field. Some emphasize the 
commonalities in striving for more realism in our conceptions of the economy,173 others 
highlight the differences in defining what these realities actually are.174 For many behavioural 
economists, these realities are still ‘found’ – in human nature, in observable behaviour, in 
given institutional settings – and usually not furthered questioned. For sociologists and socio-
economists, namely those of a more constructivist bent, these realities are always ‘produced’ 
in certain contexts – of social interaction, institutionalized relations, political-economic 
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regimes and scientific rationalities – which are historically and culturally contingent and can 
therefore themselves become a subject of enquiry. 
In 2003, the SER addressed ‘the potential contributions of behavioural economics to socio-
economics’ in a discussion forum based on a panel of the 2009 SASE Annual Conference.175 
In this context, Streeck takes a very critical stance towards behavioural economics, which for 
him rests on the assumption ‘that the “natural,” instinctive base of human behaviour is the 
leading determinant of how people act’ and ‘that differences can be reduced to and subsumed 
under commonalities’. 176  What was sought for are behavioural universals, while the 
‘enormous differences we observe between individuals and historical periods with respect to 
almost everything that really matters’ were neglected.177 Already before, Streeck had argued 
together with Jens Beckert, who was co-editor of the SER at that time, that the behavioural 
response to neoclassical economics is ‘severely misleading’, and that namely ‘the attempt to 
trace regularities in social action to psychological universals or even neurological 
endowments’ is ‘fundamentally mistaken’. 178  Instead, they request to take the ‘macro-
foundations of individual action’ seriously, which they believe ‘must be at the center of any 
realistic theory not just of social but also of economic action’. 179  In contrast, Etzioni’s 
position has overall been more supportive of the developments in behavioural economics: 
‘Even though behavioral economists are not considered as socio-economists, they do make 
important contributions to the agenda of the developing [field of] socio-economics – in 
particular in its cognitive and individualist elements.’180 
As a political scientist and economic sociologist active in experimental research, Kittel 
emphasizes the ‘potential for fruitful collaboration’ between behavioural economics and 
economic sociology181 and eventually suggests a division of labour alongside the deductive-
nomological model of science. However, to make this point, Kittel first has to fend of 
criticisms of behavioural and experimental research by the ‘mainstream of economic 
sociology’,182 which he finds uninformed and biased. For this purpose, he also engages with 
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the paradigmatic differences between the two.183 His integrative vision is that behavioural 
and experimental research would establish the ‘universal laws’ of economic action 
(microfoundation), while research into the structure or culture of societies would specify its 
‘initial conditions’ (macrocontextualization): ‘Together these could form the explanans of an 
explanation.’184 However, under the sociological premise of institutionalism, culturalism, or 
constructivism it would be misleading to prioritize the formulation of ‘general laws’ over the 
specification of ‘initial conditions’, as the deductive-nomological model suggests, and put 
behavioural economists in charge of the former and economic sociologists and socio-
economists of the latter. Instead, it would also have to be explored to what extent the general 
laws of behaviour sought or found in experimental studies are actually an artefact of specific 
economic, political and cultural conditions. The ‘ultimate’ subject matter is then not our 
universal human nature but our contemporary society. The concern is thus that behavioural 
economics attributes its findings to the cognitive formatting of mankind, as it has existed for 
many thousand years, instead of focusing on how economy and society have evolved in the 
last few hundred years, or even decades, and how they shape economic action in ever 
different and distinctively modern ways. 
 
 
6. The hidden meaning of subjecting behavioural economic man to governance by nudges 
 
Behavioural economics and socio-economics converge in one important aspect: they demand 
a more realistic model of man than neoclassical economics has on offer. However, many 
social scientists would agree that there is not one right model of man, or one best theory of 
action. In Economy and Society, 185  Weber introduced four ideal types of social action, 
namely, instrumentally rational, value rational, affectual, and traditional action. Similarly, 
Schimank presents four models of man: homo sociologicus, homo economicus, emotional 
man, and ‘identity maintainer’.186 In comparing and combining different theories of action, 
emphasis is put on the relation between homo sociologicus and homo economicus. Zafirovski 
contrasts the purported ‘assumption’ of neoclassical economics and rational choice theory 
‘that economic or rational variables are always primary in relation to sociological or non-
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rational ones’ with the ‘opposite assumption’ of socio-economics regarding the ‘empirical 
primacy of nonrational behavior relative to rational one’. 187  Schimank argues that it is 
analytically easiest to start from the assumption of norm conformity and always to check first 
whether certain patterns of behaviour can be explained by existing social norms and 
routines. 188  However, he also emphasizes that self-interested rational action has become 
increasingly ‘normal’ in modern society. In Weber’s terms, it has gained ‘cultural 
significance’.189 Hence, ‘theoretical primacy’ is given to homo economicus.190 This means no 
less than that, sociologically speaking, the validity of utilitarian explanations of action is also 
an artefact of the process of ‘rationalization’ in modern societies.191 As such, it bears witness 
to the performativity of economic models of man in today’s ‘market society’.192 By analogy, 
this raises the question of the cultural significance of the ‘new’ model of boundedly rational 
man, its societal preconditions and practical consequences. What is at stake can be 
highlighted by contrasting and connecting three models of economic man, or homo socio-
economicus for that matter: homo economicus rationalis, homo economicus behavioralis and 
homo economicus culturalis.193 
Homo economicus rationalis refers to the (neo)classical model of economic man, which has 
been given different interpretations over time.194 In the present context, the question is less 
whether this is a good scientific model that allows to generate accurate explanations and 
predictions but whether this is a good policy template that helps to promote individual and 
collective welfare. Indeed, one can assume that much of the present debate is not about 
science but about politics, or about where science turns into politics by way of its normative 
and performative effects. The argument is then not that the maximization or consistency 
approach are inadequate or inferior scientific models, but that they do insufficient service to 
society, say, by informing policies that privilege more rational over less rational consumers. 
In this regard, the ‘fiction’ of rational economic man would be first and foremost under attack 
for its conservative policy implications. Against this backdrop, it is little surprising that the 
new behavioural approaches evoke particular interest in the field of consumer law, which can 
be described as ‘intrinsically paternalistic in that it seeks to protect consumers from making 
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decisions deemed bad for them and offers remedy when they do’.195 In more classical terms, 
consumers are perceived to be the weaker party of business-to-consumer contracts, which 
needs special protection. Whereas the prototype of modern (paternalist) consumer law thus 
seems to be the naïve consumer, neoclassical (law and) economics takes rational consumers 
as a starting point, who just have to be provided with sufficient information.196 
Behavioural economics counters the theoretical primacy of homo economicus rationalis with 
the empirical priority of homo economicus behavioralis. The axiomatic model of neoclassical 
economics is replaced with a more realistic one that has different policy implications and, 
most prominently, justifies an agenda of proactive ‘nudging’.197 Whether this results in more 
or less regulation is subject to debate,198 and also depends on the context, which is marked by 
the (ideological) alternative of market-based libertarianism and state-based paternalism. In a 
context in which libertarianism has strong roots, nudges promise more social protection 
without sacrificing the freedom of choice of rational consumers. This is a plausible normative 
starting point in the United States. In contrast, in a context in which paternalism has a 
stronger tradition, as it is the case in many European countries, the cultural default is a more 
protective legal framework. However, relatively rigid regimes of consumer protection also 
have their shortcomings. Against this backdrop, a policy of nudging becomes attractive since 
it seems to allow the continuation of paternalism by other, less burdensome means. An 
additional factor shaping the European context is the European Union, which worked towards 
more market-conform consumer policies, mostly drawing on the neoclassical, or 
neoinstitutional, information paradigm. This ‘apparent anti-model of behavioural 
regulation’199 is now at stake again. In the light of the new findings of behavioural economics 
and social psychology, 200  some European legal scholars thus explicitly argue for more 
‘intrusive’ consumer policies.201 However, the idea of governance by nudges, which came to 
Europe from the United States, is charged with different cultural premises: 202  a strong 
‘normative commitment to freedom of choice’203 and, relatedly, to regulatory strategies of 
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‘debiasing’ individual decision-making, which suggests that it is possible to get down to pure 
preferences that are free from any cognitive or social distortions. The failure to subject this 
pre-analytical commitment to empirical evidence, and confront it with behavioural accounts 
of the endogeneity, or social contingency, of individual preferences, has been referred to as 
the ‘artificial truncation problem’.204 
 
The libertarian pedigree of behavioural economics shows not least in the latter’s insistence on 
the rationality norm. While it is conceded that the normative ideal of rational decision-
making may yield suboptimal outcomes when applied to ‘real’ human beings, a suitable 
remedy is found in manipulations of the choice architecture, or the technique of nudging. In 
other words, rational action can be induced by institutional means. On the abstract level, the 
idea that economic agents may act rationally in certain institutional environments without 
being rational as concrete persons, is nothing new. Indeed, it forms part of (macro-)economic 
explanation for the power of ‘as if’ assumptions in the rational choice approach. In other 
words, rational decision-making is not a property of individuals; it is a product of interaction, 
or the effect of institutions, in a given social context that shapes, or channels, individual 
behaviour towards rational action. The predictive power of ‘as if’ assumptions would then, in 
fact, rest on the disciplining function of markets, networks, and hierarchies, and not on the 
psychological qualities of individuals. Ideally, ‘these institutions press you to approximate 
your behavior to that of an economic agent’.205 In short, economic rationality is ‘socially 
constituted’.206 
In economic sociology, the social constitution of economic rationality has been captured in 
terms of ‘agencement’, a neologism which seeks to describe the ‘socio-technical 
arrangements’ that create and condition agency. 207  The notion of agencement includes 
‘human beings (bodies) as well as material, technical and textual devices’208 and thus bridges 
the conceptual dichotomy between individuals and institutions. Institutions are understood as 
‘socio-cognitive prostheses that enable the (economic) formatting of individual behaviours’, 
209 such as in bringing about rational economic action. Even though economic agency may be 
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attributed to individuals, it is constituted as much by extra-individual forces that increase or 
restrict their capacity of ‘economic valuation’.210 Individuals are limited in their cognitive 
capacities, but they can be enabled to act in an economically rational way by their 
institutional environment. What is new in behavioural economics is the concrete emphasis on 
a subliminal choice architecture that reckons with individual cognitive biases. In this context, 
the notion of socio-cognitive prostheses seems particularly apt. 
 
Whereas rational economic man is modelled on voluntary, reasoned or consistent economic 
action, behavioural economic man brings irrational or unreflected patterns of behaviour to the 
fore. The purpose of contrasting homo economicus rationalis and homo economicus 
behavioralis with a third model of economic man – homo economicus culturalis – is twofold. 
In a substantivist or ontological perspective, it captures those aspects of economic man, 
which are neglected in the other two models or only represented in a reductionist manner. In 
a constructivist or epistemological perspective, it emphasizes the cultural contingency of any 
(economic) model of man and points to the respective limitations of the other two models, 
whose axiomatic or universalist claims are theoretically meaningful, empirically 
substantiated, and culturally significant only in the here and now. In substantive terms, 
cultural economic man can be understood as a version of Zafirovski’s ‘homo complexicus’, 
who embodies rational and nonrational features of modern economic man.211 Moreover, this 
ideal type lays emphasis on the social embeddedness of economic action, which has to be 
approached on micro-, meso- and macro-analytical levels.212 In epistemological terms, or on 
the meta-level of social embeddedness, this includes the study of models of man as social and 
scientific constructions which shape reality by way of its ‘rationalization’. The model of 
cultural economic man thus has a critical potential with regard to the premises and effects of 
science, which the other two models are missing. Hence, besides competing with rational and 
behavioural economic man for the best empirical description of economic realities, the 
reflexivity of cultural economic man helps to put the methodological debate between rational 
and behavioural economic man into perspective and link it with contemporary economic and 
political developments. At any rate, the recent rise of behavioural economic man appears to 
be ‘culturally significant’. 
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The normative implications of opting either for homo economicus rationalis or homo 
economicus behavioralis as a subject of governance are different. The rationality assumption 
is reflected in policies which emphasize individual agency, or an ‘internal locus of control’. 
Rationality is being ‘personified’. Policies that reckon with bounded rationality suggest an 
‘external locus of control’ instead. Irrationality is being ‘reified’. A similar argument is made 
by Harding:213 ‘By describing human behavior as irrational, and presupposing that individual 
decision-making is permanently deficient, individuals lose agency over their rationality.’ 
Whereas the classical model emphasizes ‘will power, self-interest, and rationality’, the 
behavioural model ultimately ‘degrade[s] humans to slaves of their deficient cognitions’.214 
Sociologically speaking, freedom is a social practice of attributing and taking 
responsibility.215 It cannot just be presumed by politics, nor should it be undermined. Cserne 
contrasts, to the same effect, two conceptions of law: law as a ‘normative framework’ which 
assumes responsive persons who are ‘given reasons to act’, and law as a ‘governance 
mechanism’, or a means of ‘social engineering’, which basically works through 
manipulation.216 
 
While behavioural economics thus claims to be more ‘positive’ than neoclassical economics 
it is not necessarily less normative in defining behavioural norms that also guide economic 
policies. As a case in point, ‘libertarian paternalism’ confirms the institutional and regulatory 
ideal of rational choice as much as the individualized and normalized ‘reality’ of cognitive 
biases. From a socio-economic or socio-legal perspective, libertarian paternalism can be seen 
as a new mode of governance,217 which consists in a strategy ‘to govern and manipulate the 
design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choice and preferences’:218 in short, 
‘governance by nudges’. In Thaler and Sunstein’s words, the aim is to ‘steer people’s choices 
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in directions that will improve their lives’.219 The concept of nudges rests on a commitment 
to the principles of rationality and efficiency which were already connected with the 
neoclassical model: albeit not as axiomatic assumptions this time, but as intended outcomes 
of the design of ‘choice architecture’. In other words, the aim of libertarian paternalism is 
‘the fabrication of the conditions of rationality and efficiency’ where they are missing in 
reality.220 In this sense, the rationale of governance by nudges is to amend the neoclassical 
model not only in theory but also in practice. 
 
New modes of governance typically encourage the collaboration of public and private actors 
in ‘ordering’ society, that is, they draw on ‘a third-way vision between unregulated markets 
and top-down government controls’.221 Similarly, libertarian paternalism seeks to strike a 
balance between state-based paternalism and market-based libertarianism. Against this 
backdrop, nudges are but an addition to the ‘policymaking toolbox’ of new governance.222 
From a sociological point of view, policy instruments are not neutral but may exert normative 
and performative effects by themselves.223 This concerns not least the question of how the 
policy problem is framed and how it is, therefore, supposed to be solved, for example, as a 
problem of state failure, market failure, or human failure. From this perspective, ‘[public 
policy] instrumentation is really a political issue’.224 The concern that nudges are more about 
manipulation than about empowerment225 has to do with the very politics of instrumentation. 
In the words of Soss et al.,226 libertarian paternalism ‘reframes collective policy questions as 
problems of individual choice and uses the cognitive biases revealed by behavioral 
economics to justify expert manipulations of “choice architecture”’. 
Hence, nudges carry the implicit or explicit policy message that the problem is in cognitive 
biases which can be cured, or compensated, by institutional prostheses. One could argue that 
the focus is thus as much on shaping individual behaviour as on changing social institutions. 
However, at a closer look, governance by nudges consists in modifying ‘minor’ institutions in 
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order to safeguard ‘major’ ones. By adjusting certain institutional parameters (such as the 
default option in private pension plans), individual behaviour can be geared towards the 
challenges of a complex institutional environment (such as the three-tiered pension system), 
which is taken as given, or considered without alternative. As Santos puts it, ‘[t]he minimalist 
solutions of choice architecture contain an implicit acceptance of the prevalent institutional 
arrangements’. 227  Put differently, the market environment is taken as positively and 
normatively given, whereas individual economic actors require socio-cognitive prostheses to 
act in their own best interest. This is why it is important to situate governance by nudges in 
the context of the transformation of welfare capitalism,228 which includes the liberalization 
and privatization of former state monopolies. Simply speaking, this means ‘less state’ and 
‘more market’ in the provision of services of general interest and consumer welfare writ 
large. Against this backdrop, nudges are but a new way to protect boundedly rational 
consumers (turned into ‘market citizens’) in the flurry of private contracts and market 
relations shaping their lives from the cradle to the grave. An assessment of whether 
libertarian paternalism means more or less social protection with regard to the status quo ante 
– ‘the way things were before’ – thus requires not only comparing single policies with and 
without nudging, but to consider welfare systems as a whole before and after liberalization. 
The balance might look quite different depending on the starting point, which may (or may 
not) be the ‘European social model’. As indicated above, this has already been redefined by 
European Union law, which has now become the target of behavioural law and economics 





Behavioural economics is an interdisciplinary research field, but it is selective in what 
behavioural disciplines it draws upon and which research paradigms it buys into. The aim of 
this chapter has been to demonstrate this selectivity by focusing on the question of what is the 
‘social’ in behavioural economics, which allows contrasting it with socio-economics, its more 
sociologically minded cousin. While behavioural economics and socio-economics have 
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common ground in their opposition to neoclassical economics, they developed in different 
directions, and they notably differ in how they deal with social complexity. Focusing on the 
‘cognitive’ component of behavioural economics, which is associated with the much-
publicized idea of nudging, the methodological differences are particularly clear. A 
conception of the ‘social’, which reckons with the cognitive failures of individual human 
beings, and does not reflect on the social background of their ‘deficiencies’, nor the political 
context of nudging, can rightfully be found to be ‘very thin’.230 Other strands of scholarship 
in behavioural economics may draw on a ‘thicker’ understanding of the social, but they still 
stick to the rigidities of the rational choice model. In contrast, a distinctly sociological 
approach would also be able to put the rise of behavioural economics into perspective: by 
laying emphasis on the embeddedness of economic action in history and culture, the interplay 
of power and knowledge in socio-economic regimes, and the reflexivity and performativity of 
science in society. Lacking this critical potential, the ‘choice architectures’ of libertarian 
paternalism ultimately tell us more about ‘[behavioural] economists’ conceptions of 
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